





Business Groups and Tunneling: 







This paper investigates the intragroup flows of brand royalties within large Korean business groups. 
We find that business group member firms pay a greater amount of brand royalties when the 
associated business groups adopt a holding company governance structure, consistent with the 
public allegation that chaebols tunnel wealth from member firms to holding companies that they 
directly control. However, member firms pay a smaller amount of brand royalties when their 
related party transactions (RPTs) are monitored, for example, when the firm is on (i) the watch list 
of an external watchdog agency for controlling shareholders’ unfair profit reaping from RPTs or 
when its board of directors internally operates (ii) a designated committee on RPTs or (iii) an audit 
committee. The results suggest that the alleged tunneling behavior of large business groups can be 
mitigated by external or internal monitoring on RPTs.      
 
 




Business Groups and Tunneling: 
Evidence from Brand Royalty Flows within Chaebol 
 
1. Introduction 
Chaebol, which is a combination of two Korean words ‘chae’ (wealth) and ‘bol’ (clan or clique), 
is a form of corporate structure that is common in emerging economies such as Korea (Almeida, 
Kim, and Kim 2015; Chang and Hong 2002; Khanna and Palepu 1997, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 
2001). Chaebol member firms often pay a substantial amount of brand royalty fees to the group-
brand name or trademark holder, who is either the holding company or the core/parent firm of the 
business group. In 2017, an average chaebol member firm paid 2.5 billion Korean won (KRW) 
(approximately US $2.3 million) or 0.35 percent of total sales. This intra-group brand royalty fee 
payment is a type of related party transactions (RPTs) between brand-name holders and beneficiary 
firms, but has not been investigated in the literature on RPTs.  
 Not all RPTs are detrimental to the interest of minority shareholders and firm value.  In 
fact, many RPTs are just fair business exchanges between related parties, and their terms and 
conditions are often contractually more efficient than those of similar arm’s length transactions 
because of low transaction costs and solid mutual understanding among related parties. However, 
after a series of high profile scandals abusing RPTs (e.g., Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom), 
capital market participants begin apprehensively to perceive RPTs as a potential conduit for 
controlling shareholders to tunnel corporate resources to themselves, which gives rise to conflicts 
of interest among shareholders and stakeholders. To address growing concerns over the conflicts 
of interest in RPTs, regulators and watchdogs around the world come up with a variety of measures 
and governance mechanisms to enhance investor protections (see Center for Audit Quality 2010; 
CFA Institute 2009; European Commission 2011a, 2011b; IAASB 2009; IASB 2008; OECD 2009, 
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2012, 2015; PCAOB 2014 for details).  
 In this study, we examine the flows of brand royalty fees within chaebol and the effect of 
the intragroup RPT monitoring on the inequitable brand royalty payment. At first glance, chaebols 
seem to charge the brand royalty fee equitably to their member firms. The brand royalty formulas 
tend to reflect the beneficiary firm’s capacity to bear the cost because brand royalties are usually 
determined as a percentage of sales volumes or operating profits, sometimes after adjusting for 
advertising-related outlays (see Appendix B for some illustrations of brand royalty fee formulas 
discussed in section 2.1.).  
However, the brand royalty formulas do not necessarily represent the benefits obtained by 
the beneficiary firms from using the group-brand name. Specifically, not all chaebol member firms 
pay brand royalty fees to the group-brand name holder. Some member firms do not pay brand 
royalty fees even when other member firms in the same chaebol group pay. Further, some other 
chaebols charge brand royalty fees to none of their member firms.  
Accordingly, regulators and stakeholders have questioned whether brand-name holders 
have legitimate rights to receive a brand royalty and whether brand royalty fees are fairly 
determined and imposed on chaebol member firms. For example, Annuncio (1996) reports that 
minority shareholders are displeased with brand royalty fees charged by Tata Group of India. In 
Korea, Lee (2008) alleges that chaebol holding companies collect too much brand royalty fees 
from subsidiaries to boost income. Recently, the Korean National Assembly has discussed the issue 
of brand royalty fees, and several lawmakers urged the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to 
monitor closely the flows of brand royalties within the chaebol to prevent chaebol owners from 
taking unfair personal gain (Bae 2017). 
Korean chaebols have utilized various types of RPTs including the web of circular 
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ownership (i.e., cross shareholding) and mutual debt guarantees to entrench management and 
retain wealth within the founding family. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the KFTC 
perceives the intragroup capital transactions (i.e., cross shareholding and mutual debt guarantee) 
as the root cause of structural inefficiencies in chaebols and thus has attempted to unweave the 
circular-ownership web; the KFTC urges the chaebol to transform the traditional circular 
ownership matrix to a one-directional, holding company governance structure. Business press 
notices an unexpected consequence of the holding company system in which the ownership of 
group-brand names and logos is often transferred to the holding companies: chaebols tunnel the 
wealth of brand royalty-paying member firms to the brand-name holder. Since 2018, the KFTC 
has made it mandatory for chaebols to disclose brand royalty information in response to 
accumulating woes over chaebol owners collecting excessive brand royalty fees. We utilize this 
first-ever publicly disclosed information to examine whether chaebols indeed collect the 
intragroup brand royalty fee inequitably for the benefit of the chaebol owners, as alleged, and 
whether such an opportunistic intragroup RPT can be mitigated by external or internal monitoring 
of RPTs.  
Our investigation of 396 chaebol member firms belonging to 39 large business groups 
yields the following results. First, we find that chaebol member firms pay a greater amount of 
brand royalty fees when the associated business groups have adopted a holding company 
governance system. We further find that the functional nature of the holding company influences 
brand royalties: chaebol member firms pay higher brand royalties when the holding company of 
the associated business group does not operate its own income-generating business units than when 
it does. The results are consistent with the allegation that some chaebols use intragroup brand 
royalty fees opportunistically to boost the incomes of group-brand name holders.     
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Next, we find that chaebol member firms pay a smaller amount of brand royalty fees when 
their RPTs are monitored: more specifically, when the firm is on the KFTC’s watch list for close 
monitoring of unfair profit reaping by the founding family or when its group operates an RPTs 
committee or an audit committee on the board of directors. We further find the moderating effect 
of RPT monitoring, particularly that of internal committees such as an RPTs committee and an 
audit committee, on the higher brand royalty payment by chaebol member firms to the holding 
company. To summarize, while RPT monitoring, regardless of external or internal monitoring, 
helps reduce the amount of brand royalty fee collection, the internal monitoring through an RPTs 
committee and an audit committee is effective in restraining chaebols under the holding company 
governance structure from collecting the immoderate amount of brand royalty fees from the 
member firms.  
Our study contributes to the literature as follows. First, we add to the literature on RPTs 
by shedding a new light on brand royalty, specifically by showing how group-brand royalty fees 
are determined and charged to member firms of large business groups. Unlike franchise fees 
charged to franchisees at an arm’s length, brand royalty fees charged to business group member 
firms tend to be arbitrary, often lacking economic rationales and legitimacy. The study enriches 
our knowledge of a new type of RPTs, namely brand royalty fee payments.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on tunneling by providing empirical evidence of 
possible tunneling behavior through intragroup brand royalty fee allocations. Previous studies 
document that controlling shareholders of business groups pursue personal interests through 
various channels such as mergers and acquisitions, private security offering, and intragroup 
charitable contribution allocations (Bae, Kang, and Kim 2002; Baek, Kang, and Lee 2006; Kim, 
Pae, and Yoo 2019). We extend the literature by adding another tunneling channel, namely 
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intragroup brand royalty payments. To date, there exist only plausible allegations without hard 
evidence or supporting scholarly research on tunneling through brand royalty. 
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on effective governance mechanisms for mitigating 
conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between the controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (e.g., Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2008; Huyghebaert and Wang 2012). Recently, the KFTC expanded the disclosure 
requirements for the RPTs of large business groups by adding brand royalty fee transactions. The 
new disclosure requirement aims to hinder chaebols from engaging in the allegedly unethical 
tunneling through brand royalty. Our findings further suggest that explicit monitoring by the 
regulators and an internal governance mechanism like an RPTs committee and an audit committee 
would constrain chaebols’ opportunistic tunneling behavior through intragroup brand royalty flows. 
Specifically, we introduce the RPTs committee on boards as a new internal governance mechanism 
that has never been examined in prior studies and document its effectiveness in discouraging 
abusive RPTs.  
In sum, our study will help researchers as well as various stakeholders including those in 
other countries better understand how intragroup brand royalties are determined and how the 
allegedly unethical tunneling behavior through the intragroup royalties can be moderated.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
institutional background and develop the hypothesis. We then describe our sample data and 
develop the research design. We present our results and further analysis. Finally, we summarize 





2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Brand Royalty Fee Payment as an RPT and Tunneling Channel 
International Accounting Standards Board defines an RPT as a transfer of resources, 
services or obligations between a firm and a related party that is a person or firm, regardless of 
whether a price is charged (IASB 2008; see FASB 1982 for the similar definition in US GAAP). 
The related person, including her close family and key management personnel members, have 
control, joint control, or significant influence of the reporting firm, and the related firm is in the 
same business group, an associate, or a joint venture. RPTs may fulfil both parties’ sound economic 
needs and be executed at equitable prices with similar arm’s length conditions (efficient 
contracting perspective). However, in the real business world, RPTs are often carried out in favor 
of one party of the transactions at the expense of the other party (conflicts of interest perspective). 
Thus, the dominant perspective on RPTs among regulators, watchdogs, minority shareholders, and 
academics is to guard against abusive RPTs (see OECD 2015 for the perspective of market 
participants and Cheung, Qi, Lu, Rau, and Stouraitis 2009 for that of academics).  
According to Asia-Pacific Office of the CFA Institute (CFA Institute 2009), in Asia, RPTs 
between a company and other corporate entities (mostly within the same business group) is the 
most common tool for wealth transfers out of the company for the benefit of controlling 
shareholders (a.k.a., tunneling). This is different from the United State (specifically, before the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) where a majority of RPTs occur between a company and its officers 
and major shareholders in the form of loans, guarantees, and collateral.  
The extant literature on tunneling documents several channels by which controlling 
shareholders of chaebols take private profit from minority shareholders. For instances, mergers 
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and acquisitions between chaebol member firms (Bae et al. 2002); private security offerings to 
other chaebol member firms (Baek et al. 2006); and strategic allocation of charitable contributions 
within the business group (Kim et al. 2019). But, no scholarly research has ever examined as a 
tunneling mechanism the brand royalty fee transactions within the business group.  
Contracts for intragroup brand royalty fee flows within the business group are at the 
discretion of the brand-name holders and beneficiary firms and do not require formal approval 
from the board of directors.1 The business press has been consistently questioning the possibility 
of chaebol owners taking private profits from the brand royalty fee allocation (e.g., Annuncio 1996, 
Lee 2008, KFTC 2018b). To make it worse, intragroup RPTs and outstanding balances are not 
reported in the consolidated financial statements of the group because they are eliminated in the 
consolidation process (IFRS 24, para. 4). In response, the KFTC announced a mandatory 
disclosure code of brand royalty fees in March 2018 (KTFC 2018a). Accordingly, large chaebols 
with total assets of five trillion Korean won and above are required to file the details of their brand 
royalty fees, including the brand in contract, the payers and payees, contract period, the annual 
amount paid, and brand royalty fee formula.  
Appendix B presents examples of brand royalty fee formulas reported in the mandatory 
disclosures of RPTs. Six member firms of Halla Group disclose the formulas of their brand royalty 
fees paid to Halla Holdings Corp., the brand-name holder. Halla Group uses consolidated sales 
after deducting advertising expense as the imputation base of its formula. In FY 2017, Halla Mits 
(Halla Encom) paid 0.60 (0.10) percent of the imputation base to Halla Holdings Corp. In FY 2018, 
the two firms are no longer the member of the business group. Also, note that Mokpo Newport and 
                                           
1 According to the KFTC (2018b), none of the brand royalty fee payments were approved or even discussed at general 
shareholders’ meetings, not to mention approval from the board of directors.  
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Halla OMS (Halla) raise the charging rate from 0.20 (0.10) percent in FY 2017 to 0.40 (0.20) 
percent in FY 2018 when the business group lost the two brand royalty payers (Halla Mits and 
Halla Encom). Halla Group has not disclosed why the group doubled the charging rate. 
Next, in the case of Amore Pacific Group, Amore Pacific (Osulloc) paid 0.18 (0.015) 
percent of the imputation base to Amore Pacific Group Corp. and there was no change in the 
charging rate between FY 2017 and 2018. And, HHIC Group member firms do not disclose brand 
royalty information in FY 2018 as the group is no longer on the list of top 60 largest business 
groups subject to the mandatory disclosures of RPTs in the year. 
Last, the KFTC mandated the board of directors’ formal approval of brand royalty fee when 
the fee amount exceeds five percent of shareholders’ equity or five billion Korean won. The KFTC 
claims that the improved transparency resulting from the mandatory disclosure requirement will 
facilitate intragroup and intergroup comparisons and enable stakeholders to better monitor 
controlling shareholders’ private profit-taking through brand royalty.  
2.2. Holding Companies in Korea 
Holding companies are a kind of special purpose entities that hold controlling-levels of 
equity of a group of subsidiary firms and whose principal activity is owning the business group 
(European Commission 2008). According to Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in 
the European Community (European Commission 2008), the primary roles of holding companies 
exclude the active management or strategic planning and decision making of subsidiaries. That is, 
a strictly defined holding company is not expected to provide other services to its subsidiaries. 
In Korea, politicians, tax authorities, and corporate watchdogs have taken a rather fickle 
stance on the holding company governance structure of chaebols. In the 1960s and 1970s when 
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the government made the nation’s economic growth a top policy priority, it formed friendly 
partnerships with chaebols. As a result, the number and size of chaebols increased dramatically 
during the era of development. Later in the 1980s, the criticism on chaebol-centric development 
and their disproportional growth sharply arose. Accordingly, in December 1980, the government 
promulgated the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) to attenuate excessive 
concentration of economic power of chaebol (see Kim 2013 for a detailed discussion of Chaebol 
policy). Further, in December 1986, the government amended the MRFTA to ban the establishment 
of holding companies. However, the KFTC’s prohibition of holding companies was not an 
effective measure in restraining chaebols’ empire building, as they in fact relied on inter-firm, 
reciprocal circular cross-shareholding instead of the one-directional holding company ownership 
structure. 
After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the government began to deliberate on the holding 
company governance structure as a potential solution to improve the transparency of chaebol 
business groups’ tangled ownership structure and the accountability of controlling shareholders 
(Kim 2013). In particular, the government valued the relative simplicity of a one-directional 
holding company ownership structure vis-a-vis the web of inter-firm, circular cross shareholding. 
Accordingly, the government lifted a ban on holding companies in the early 2000s and even offered 
temporal special tax benefits to promote the holding company governance structure. Chaebols 
responded enthusiastically to the policy change in corporate governance regulation. In 2018, as 
many of 22 out of top 60 largest business groups adopt the holding company governance structure 
(see Panel B, Table 1).   
 After a series of amendments of the MRFTA and related Presidential Decrees and 
Guidelines on holding companies, the KFTC designates and oversees holding companies with total 
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assets of 500 billion Korean Won or larger, in which the aggregate value of subsidiaries’ shares 
comprises more than 50 percent of total assets. Note that our definition of holding companies (as 
defined in the MRFTA) is less strict than that of the European Union (EU). Our definition 
encompasses what the EU classifies as head offices, that is, the majority of Korean holding 
companies supervise and provide strategic or organizational planning services to their subsidiary 
firms.2  
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
While holding companies are not expected to operate their own business (hereafter 
referred to as pure holding companies), some holding companies in Korea have their own operating 
business units (hereafter referred to as operating holding companies). The KFTC does not 
differentiate the two types (i.e., pure vs. operating) of holding companies when it enforces the 
MRFTA. Recently, the KFTC surveyed the income sources of holding companies and reported the 
following (KFTC 2018b): For a total of 18 holding companies, dividend income from subsidiaries 
comprises only 40.8 percent of total income. Interestingly, 43.4% of the total income of the holding 
companies comes from non-dividend income sources such as brand royalty fees, real estate rental 
fees, and management consulting fees charged to subsidiaries within their own business groups.  
Under the holding company governance structure, the controlling owner of the chaebol 
would be more concerned about the value of the holding company rather than the value of 
subsidiary firms due to the relatively low direct ownership of chaebol member firms by the 
                                           
2 Chaebol member firms in Korea are under the strong group-wide control for their administrative and investment 
decisions (Champbell and Keys 2002, Chang and Hong 2000). 
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controlling owner.3 Thus, we conjecture that the alleged conflicts of interest problem associated 
with group brand royalties would be greater for chaebols with the holding company governance 
structure. In particular, we expect that holding companies that do not have a variety of income 
sources, except dividend income from subsidiaries, have incentives to boost their earnings by 
charging more brand royalty fees to subsidiaries. 
In summary, while the holding company governance structure promoted by the KFTC helps 
unweave the tangled circular-ownership web of chaebols, it may also engender and exacerbate an 
unexpected conflicts of interest problem: that is, excessive brand royalty charging to chaebol 
member firms by the holding company controlled by the founding family of the chaebol. Our first 
hypothesis concerns whether a business group is more likely to use brand royalties as a tunneling 
channel for the benefit of controlling shareholders when the group-brand name holder is a holding 
company.4    
H1. A chaebol member firm pays a larger brand royalty fee when it belongs to a business 
group with a holding company governance structure.  
 
Next, we examine the effect of RPT monitoring on brand royalty payments. To protect 
minority shareholders from the controlling shareholders’ tunneling through unethical RPTs, 
regulators and watchdogs have come up with a variety of measures and governance mechanisms. 
First, accounting standards setters have been stepping up the extent and information requirements 
                                           
3 In our sample, the controlling owner of chaebols on average owns 25.7% of his holding company (the brand-name 
holder) vis-à-vis only 1.9% of its member firms paying brand royalties. In contrast, for chaebols without holding 
companies, the controlling owner on average owns 10.2% of the brand holder and 14.7% of brand royalty paying 
member firms (see Panel E, Table 1 for details). 
4 While we focus on a chaebol member firm’s brand royalty payment in the first hypothesis, we also examine whether 
a holding company collects a greater amount of brand royalty fees than other types of brand royalty fee recipients (see 
Table 6 and related discussions).  
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of RPTs disclosures (FASB 1982; IASB 2008). However, the RPTs information available in 
financial reports is still deemed insufficient for outside shareholders to make an informed judgment 
because the materiality threshold of RPTs disclosure is at the discretion of managers.5 In line with 
the CFA Institute’s recommendation of regulatory bodies playing a more active role in enhancing 
and complementing RPT information in financial reports (CFA Institute 2009), U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires more extensive disclosure in annual proxy statements and 
the KFTC mandates chaebols to provide additional and separate disclosure.  
While the aforementioned RPT disclosures can level the playing field in which information 
asymmetry exists, the public disclosures regardless of financial reporting or regulatory 
requirements may not suffice. The public disclosures inform minority shareholders only about 
historical events which have already happened. That means, investors who cannot predict 
tunneling need to wait until a tunneling occurs and then revalue the firm in accordance with the 
event (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2006).  
Ex-ante monitoring of RPTs would be effective in preempting potentially abusive RPTs. 
Of course, if brand royalties are charged equitably to reflect the benefits and values of using group-
brand name or logo, the monitoring of RPTs (which include intragroup flows of brand royalties) 
would have no effect. Yet, the KFTC and the business press have questioned if some business 
groups use intragroup brand royalties as a tunneling channel to transfer wealth to controlling 
shareholders. We posit that, even if controlling shareholders are tempted to transfer wealth from 
other member firms to the core company in which they hold significant ownership, an explicit 
                                           
5 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Interim Auditing Standards state that "an audit performed 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards cannot be expected to provide assurance that all related-
party transactions will be discovered (PCAOB 2004). 
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monitoring of RPTs will subdue their urge to take private profits through intragroup brand royalty 
flows. That is, an explicit monitoring on RPTs will decrease the amount of brand royalty fees that 
a member firm pays to the brand-name holder company within the business group. Thus, we 
predict that a member firm pays a smaller amount of brand royalty fees when monitored for its 
RPTs.  
Specifically, we consider both external and internal monitoring. Since February 2014, the 
KFTC has announced an annual list of chaebol member firms subject to close monitoring of RPTs. 
For those chaebol member firms on the watch list, the KFTC scrutinizes the following four abusive 
RPTs: i) transaction terms which are far better than ordinary transactions with outsiders, ii) offering 
lucrative business opportunities to the business group member firms, iii) favorable monetary 
transactions with the business group member firms, and iv) conducting a significant size of RPTs 
without considering alternative transaction parties. In 2018, the KFTC posted a watch list of 203 
chaebol member firms.  
Meanwhile, some chaebols internally operate a so called related-party transactions 
committee, a subcommittee, on their board of directors. While the installment of an RPTs 
committee is not required by laws and regulations, chaebols have started using it to gird themselves 
for the increased risk of the government sanctions or corporate scandals against intragroup 
tunneling. In 2014, only 23.1 percent of chaebol member firms have the RPTs committee, but the 
number rose to 35.6 percent in 2018 (KFTC 2018c). For example, the RPTs committee of Samsung 
Electronics, established in 2004, consists of three non-executive, independent directors, and its 
primary responsibility is the monitoring of RPTs (see Figure 1 for details of the RPTs committee 
of Samsung Electronics).  
Research suggest that the audit committees on the board of directors helps protect the 
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interests of minority shareholders from abusive RPTs (e.g., Cheung, Qi, Lu, Rau, and Stouraitis 
2009). The audit committee, a subcommittee of the board of directors, is responsible for 
establishing policies for and overseeing the financial reporting, internal control systems, the audit 
process, and compliance with related laws and regulations. Thus, the audit committee will review 
the legitimacy of ‘material’ RPTs (including brand royalty fee contract that pass the materiality 
threshold) and restrain the chaebol member firm from paying excessive, material brand royalty 
fees. 
The existence of such internal monitoring mechanisms would discourage firms from 
engaging in improper profit taking from intragroup related-party brand royalty flows. Taken 
together, we predict that the presence of RPT monitoring, regardless of external or internal, 
decreases the amount of brand royalty fees paid by chaebol member firms.6 Thus, our second 
hypothesis concerning the monitoring effect on brand royalty fees is as follows:  
H2. A chaebol member firm pays a smaller amount of brand royalty fees when its 
related party transactions are subject to explicit monitoring.  
 
As predicted in the first hypothesis, the controlling owner of the chaebol would have stronger 
incentives to abuse brand royalty fees as a tunneling channel when the brand-name holder is a 
holding company than a non-holding company. And, to the extent that RPT monitoring helps 
discourage unfair tunneling, the restraining effect of RPT monitoring on brand royalty fees would 
be more pronounced when chaebol member firms are under the holding company governance 
structure. Accordingly, we hypothesize the moderating effect of RPT monitoring on abuse of brand 
                                           
6 We later examine the effect of external monitoring by the KFTC and internal monitoring by RPTs committee and 
audit committee separately (see Table 5).  
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royalties as follows:  
H2a. The moderating effect of related party transaction monitoring on brand royalty 
fees is more pronounced for chaebol member firms under the holding company 
governance structure.  
 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample and Data 
We start our sample construction with chaebol member firms that are mandated by the 
KFTC to disclose their brand royalty fee information in 2018. Member firms of large business 
groups with total assets of KRW five trillion and above file the details of their brand royalty fee 
information (available at Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System, simply DART) by the end 
of May each year.  
Panel A of Table 1 describes our sample selection procedure. The initial sample consists 
of 1,098 member firms from 60 largest business groups with brand royalty information. We 
exclude 645 firms whose associated business groups do not have signed contracts for intragroup 
brand royalties.7 We then exclude firms that are members of financial business groups or that 
operate a financial and insurance business. Finally, we drop 13 observations with insufficient 
financial data. The final sample includes 396 firm observations.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the company distribution conditional on the holding company 
governance structure. The final sample consists of 39 business groups, of which 17 groups have a 
holding company structure. 
                                           
7 Business groups disclosing the absence of intragroup brand royalty contracts include Hyundai Heavy Industries, 
Daerim, Hyosung, Celltrion, Hyundai Department Store, Young Poong, KT&G, KCC, Kyobo, Daewoo E&C, Hoban, 
Naver, Dongkuk Steel, Samchully, GM Korea, Kumho Petrochemical, and Netmarble. 
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 Next, we read the KFTC annual report to identify business groups that adopted the 
holding company governance structure and determine whether chaebol member firms are subject 
to the KFTC external monitoring of RPTs by checking the ownership percentage of the founding 
family.8 Further, the KFTC annually announces business groups with RPTs committees and audit 
committees. Finally, we collect related-party sales and financial data from Korea Investors 
Services (KIS) Value and Total Solution 2000 (TS2000).  
 
3.2. Measures 
The dependent variable is the amount of brand royalty fees paid by a chaebol member firm 
to a group brand-name holder company within the same business group. Given that the distribution 
of brand royalty fee amounts are skewed and has a high standard deviation, we measure Brand 
Royalty as the natural logarithm of a member firm’s brand royalty fee scaled by the natural 
logarithm of its sales.  
 Our independent variables of interest include Holding (H1), RPTs Monitoring (H2), and 
the interaction term, Holding × RPTs Monitoring (H2a). Holding, an indicator variable for a 
member firm, is set to one if the firm belongs to a business group with the holding company 
governance structure (Panel B, Table 1). Further, we partition the holding companies into pure 
holding companies and operating holding companies. If a holding company operates its own 
business units, Holding_Operating is set to one. Otherwise, Holding_Pure is set to one. That is, a 
holding company classified as Holding Pure does not operate its own business.  
                                           
8  According to the MRFTA, the KFTC monitors RPTs of chaebol member firms when the founding family’s 
ownership exceeds 20% (30%) for private (public) member firms. In the analysis, we use the 20% threshold. But, use 
of the 30% threshold for public member firms does not affect the tenor of the results.  
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Next, we consider three types of RPT monitoring: KFTC Monitoring, RPTs Committee, 
and Audit Committee. First, we set an indicator variable of KFTC Monitoring to one if a firm is on 
the list where the KFTC closely monitors unfair RPTs practices. This firm-level information on 
external monitoring allows us to examine the effect of the watchdog’s external monitoring on 
brand royalty payments. Second, we define RPTs Committee as an indicator variable that equals 
one if the business group operates an RPTs committee on its board of directors. Finally, we define 
Audit Committee as an indicator variable that equals one if the business group operates an audit 
committee on its board of directors.    
To examine the effectiveness of the monitoring, regardless of external or internal, we set 
RPTs Monitoring to one if RPTs are externally monitored (KFTC Monitoring=1) or internally 
monitored (RPTs Committee =1 or Audit Committee =1). 
 
3.3. Regression Model 
Our first hypothesis concerns the effect of holding company governance structure 
(Holding) on the amount of brand royalty fees (Brand Royalty) that a member firm pays to the 
group brand-name holder. We test our empirical hypotheses by estimating the following regression 
model: 
Brand Royalty = α0  + α1 Holding  
+ α2 RPTs Monitoring  
+ α3 Holding × RPTs Monitoring  
+ α4 Advertising + α5 Big4Audit + α6 External Sales  
+ α7 Firm Age + α8 Firm Size + α9 Giving  
+ α10 Leverage + α11 Operating Cash Flow  
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+ α12 Ownership Percentage of Controlling Shareholder 
+ α13 ROA + α14 Group ROA + α15 Group Size  
+ α16 Number of Member Firms     
+ Industry Fixed Effects + ε,                              (1) 
where Brand Royalty is the natural log of brand royalty fees scaled by the natural log of sales; 
Holding is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a business group with the 
holding company structure. We predict a positive coefficient estimate on Holding in Equation (1) 
(i.e., H1: α1 > 0).  
Next, we examine the RPT monitoring effect with RPTs Monitoring in Equation (1). We 
predict a negative coefficient estimate on RPTs Monitoring if excessive brand royalties are bridled 
by monitoring mechanisms in place (i.e., H2: α2 < 0).  
We further investigate the moderating effect of RPTs monitoring on Holdings with the 
interaction term of Holding and RPTs Holdings. We predict a negative coefficient estimate on 
Holding × RPTs Monitoring if the tunneling effect of holding company is moderated by RPT 
monitoring (i.e., H2a: α3 < 0). 
We control for several firm-level characteristics that affect the brand royalty payments of 
chaebol member firms. We include Advertising, measured as the natural logarithm of advertising 
expenses divided by the natural logarithm of sales, because some business groups charge brand 
royalty fees based on sales after subtracting advertising expense. We include Big4Audit to control 
for the reputation of external auditors. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) find that auditors with 
higher reputations decrease the likelihood of unlawful RPTs.  
We include External Sales, measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s 
external sales to total sales. External clients may receive a sense of security, integrity and 
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technology in transactions with well-established group-brand name carrying firms. Thus, the 
benefits that chaebol members gain from using the group brand or logo would be greater when 
doing business with clients outside the business group. Accordingly, we expect a chaebol member 
firm to pay a greater amount of brand royalty fee when it relies less on intragroup related party 
sales and more on external sales from non-related parties.  
We include Firm Age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
incorporation, and Firm Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. We control for the 
level of charitable contributions, Giving, measured as the natural logarithm of charitable 
contributions divided by the natural logarithm of sales. Prior research suggests that business groups 
use Giving as a tunneling channel by strategically allocating corporate charitable contributions 
among group-affiliated firms in Korea (Kim et al. 2019).  
Next, we include Leverage and Operating Cash Flow, measured by the ratio of operating 
cash flows to sales, to control for the member firm’s reliance on debt financing and cash generating 
capability. In addition, to control for the voting power of controlling shareholders of the business 
group, we include Ownership Percentage of Controlling Shareholder, measured as the proportion 
of total shares owned by the controlling shareholder of the associated business group. Last, we 
include ROA to control for the member firm’s profitability.   
Following prior studies (e.g., Chang and Hong 2002; Ou et al. 2018), we also include 
several group-level control variables: Group ROA, Group Size, and Number of Member Firms. 
Chang and Hong (2000) suggest that the fundamental characteristics of the business group 
influence member firm’s financial and operating decisions. We measure Group ROA by the 
weighted average of ROAs of the business group’s all member firms and Group Size by the natural 
logarithm of the sum of total assets of the business group’s all member firms. Number of Member 
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Firms is measured by the number of affiliates in the group. Finally, we include industry dummy 
variables to control for the industry effect. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to alleviate the effect of outliers.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample. The sample contains a total of 
396 member firms in 39 large business groups that disclose brand royalty fee information. 51 
percent of the sample (203 firms) belongs to business groups with a holding company governance 
structure and 49 percent (193 firms) belong to business groups with no such structure. Of the 203 
firms in the business groups with holding company governance structure, 183 member firms of 14 
business groups are governed by pure holding companies and 20 member firms of three business 
groups are governed by operating holding companies (untabulated). 
Panel C of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. As presented in Panel B, 203 firms (51.3% 
of the sample) belongs to business groups with holding company governance structure (Holding). 
46.2 percent of the sample (183 firms) are governed by pure holding companies (Holding_Pure) 
and 5.1 percent of the sample (20 firms) are governed by holding companies with operating units 
(Holding_Operating). The mean value of RPTs Monitoring indicates that 71.7 percent of the 
sample firms are monitored for their RPTs. In particular, the mean value of KFTC monitoring 
suggests that 15.2 percent of the sample firms are externally monitored by the KFTC for their 
RPTs. The mean value of RPTs Committee (Audit Committee) indicates that 54 (67.9) percent of 
the sample firms are in the business groups with the RPTs committee (the audit committee). The 
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mean value of Number of Member Firms indicates that an average business group in the sample 
has approximately 22 affiliated member firms.   
In Panel D, we compare firms belonging to business groups with the holding company 
governance structure (“Firms governed by holding companies”) to other firms that are not under 
the holding company governance structure. The difference in the mean values of Brand Royalty 
(0.608 vs. 0.482) is statistically significant at the one percent level, supporting our first hypothesis 
(H1) that a chaebol member firm pays greater brand royalties when it is under the holding company 
governance structure. In the untabulated analysis, we find that the mean proportion of brand royalty 
income to the total revenue of the brand-name owner is 23 % when the brand-name holder is a 
holding company whereas the mean proportion is only 1.3% when the brand-name holder is not a 
holding company. The finding is consistent with the claim (Lee 2008) that chaebol holding 
companies boost income by collecting excessive brand royalties from subsidiaries. 
The difference in the mean values of RPTs Monitoring (0.635 vs 0.803) is statistically 
significant at the one percent level, indicating that chaebol member firms are less likely to be 
monitored for their RPTs when they are under the holding company governance structure than not. 
In particular, the mean value of KFTC Monitoring is only 0.054 for firms under the holding 
company governance structure whereas the number is 0.245 for firms not under holding company 
governance structure, indicating that firms under the holding company governance structure are 
about 20 percent less likely to be on the watch list of the KFTC’s explicit monitoring on RPTs. 
Similarly, the mean values of RPTs Committee (Audit Committee) are 0.399 (0.616) for the firms 
governed by holding companies group and 0.689 (0.746) for other firms, indicating that chaebol 
member firms are less likely to operate an RPTs committee (an audit committee) when they are 
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under the holding company governance structure than when they are not. The more lenient 
monitoring on the former group of firms is in line with the government’s promotion (e.g., favorable 
tax treatment) toward the holding company governance structure as a policy attempt to unweave 
the existing circular-ownership web of chaebols thereby improving the transparency and 
accountability of chaebols’ management.  
In Panel E, we compare Ownership Percentage of Controlling Shareholder between 
brand royalty paying firms and recipient firms. First, the difference in the mean values of 
Ownership Percentage of Controlling Shareholder (-7.541=8.179-15.72) is statistically significant 
at the five percent level, indicating that the controlling owner on average has a stronger interest on 
the value of brand-royalty recipient firms than that of brand royalty paying firms.  
Next, the difference (-23.768=1.972-25.74) in chaebols with the holding company 
governance structure is even more severe than that of the full sample (-7.541) and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. On average, the voting power of a chaebol controlling is 13 
times (=25.740/1.972) greater in his holding company than in his member firms.  
Finally, the difference in chaebols without the holding company governance structure is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the controlling ownership between brand royalty paying 
firms and recipient firms is not meaningfully different when chaebols do not have a holding 
company. 
In summary, the results in Panel E suggest that the controlling owner of the chaebol 
would be more concerned about the value of the holding company than the value of other member 
firms due to the relatively low direct ownership of chaebol member firms by the controlling owner, 
and the unbalance in the controlling shareholder’s interest becomes more severe when the chaebol 
adopts the holding company governance structure.  
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Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations. Consistent with our first hypothesis, Brand 
Royalty is significantly positively correlated with Holding. However, inconsistent with the second 
hypothesis, the correlation between Brand Royalty and RPTs Monitoring is insignificant.  
 
4.2. Main Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the hypothesized factors that affect brand royalty 
payments by chaebol member firms: the associated business group’s governance structure 
(Holding), presence of monitoring mechanisms for RPTs (RPTs Monitoring), and the moderating 
effect of RPT monitoring (Holding × RPTs Monitoring).  
First, in model (1), the coefficient on Holding (0.118) is significantly positive at the one 
percent level. It supports the first hypothesis (H1) that business groups tend to charge to their 
member firms a larger amount of brand royalties when they control their member firms with the 
holding company governance structure.  
Among the control variables, the coefficient on External Sales (0.176) is significantly 
positive at the one percent level, suggesting that a brand-name holder charges to its member firms 
a greater amount of brand royalty fees when the member firms rely more on external sales from 
non-related parties outside of the business group. The positive coefficients on Firm Size (0.028), 
Giving (0.112), Operating Cash Flow (0.066), and ROA (0.451) indicate that a member firm pays 
a greater amount of brand royalty fees when the firm is large, pays a greater amount of charitable 
contributions, generates more cash flows from operation, and is more profitable. We also find that 
the coefficient on Group Size (0.031) is positive, indicating that the larger the business group, the 
higher the brand royalty fee that member firms pay. Last, the coefficient on Number of Member 
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Firms (-0.002) is negative, indicating that a member firm pays a smaller amount of brand royalty 
fee when there are many other member firms within the business group.  
Next, in model (2), the coefficient on RPTs Monitoring (-0.128) is significantly negative at 
the one percent level, in support of the second hypothesis (H2) that a chaebol member firm pays a 
smaller amount of brand royalty fees when its RPTs are subject to explicit monitoring. 
In model (3) where we include both Holding and RPTs Monitoring, we find the results of 
models (1) and (2) still hold: the coefficient on Holding (0.100) is significantly positive at the one 
percent level and the coefficient on RPTs Monitoring (-0.076) remains significantly negative at the 
five percent level.   
Finally, model (4) further includes the interaction term between Holding and RPTs 
Monitoring. In line with the result of model (1), the coefficient on Holding (0.190) is significantly 
positive at the one percent level (H1). However, inconsistent with the result of model (2), the 
coefficient on the standalone RPT Monitoring is statistically insignificant (H2). That is, monitoring 
RPTs has no effect on brand royalties for those member firms not under holding company 
governance structure. But, more importantly, we find the coefficient on Holding × RPTs 
Monitoring (-0.119) is significantly negative at the five percent level, suggesting that RPT 
monitoring moderates the inflating effect of holding company governance structure on brand 
royalty fees (H2a). Specifically, the sum of the coefficients on RPTs Monitoring and Holding × 
RPTs Monitoring (-0.116 = 0.003 – 0.119) indicates that monitoring RPTs significantly reduces 
brand royalties of those member firms under holding company governance structure. Taken 
together, the coefficient estimates on the standalone RPT Monitoring and the interaction term 
(Holding × RPTs Monitoring) in model (4) suggest that RPT monitoring does not monotonously 
suppress the intragroup flow of brand royalty fees. Rather, RPT monitoring helps reduce brand 
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royalty fees of chaebol member firms conditionally when tunneling through the intragroup brand 
royalty flow likely occurs.  
In summary, we find the allegation that large business groups opportunistically use brand 
royalties to tunnel business resources to the founding family is more pronounced when business 
groups control their member firms with a holding company. The holding company governance 
structure may have enhanced the transparency of business groups by unweaving the circular 
ownership of chaebols, but at the same time it gives rise to or exacerbate the problem of unethical 
excessive brand royalty reaping by the chaebol owners. More importantly, such abuse of intragroup 
brand royalty flow can be moderated by explicit monitoring of RPTs. 
 
5. Further Analysis 
In this section, we examine whether the amount of brand royalty fees paid by chaebol 
member firms differs (i) conditional on the presence of income-generating operating units within 
the holding company and (ii) across different components of RPT monitoring (i.e., the KFTC 
monitoring, an RPTs committee, and an audit committee). And, we also examine the intragroup 
flows of brand royalties (iii) from the perspective of royalty recipient firms that hold the group 
brand-name. 
 
5.1. Pure versus Operating Holding Companies 
It has been alleged that business groups use brand royalties to boost or supplement their 
revenue incomes particularly when they control member firms using a holding company. We 
examine whether such an incentive to inflate intragroup brand royalty fee collections differs 
between holding companies without their own income-generating operating units (Holding_Pure) 
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and those with their own income-generating operating units (Holding_Operating).  
Table 4 presents the regression results conditional on the presence of own operating units 
in the holding company. Model (1) is the same as that in Table 3. In model (2), the coefficient on 
Holding_Pure (0.136) is significantly positive at the one percent level while that on 
Holding_Operating is insignificant, indicating that the inflating effect of the holding company 
governance structure on brand royalties in model (1) is mainly due to the holding companies that 
do not have their own operating units.9 The alleged abuse of brand royalties seems to be more 
pronounced for large business groups that govern member firms with a pure holding company that 
does not have its own income-generating business units (Holding_Pure=1). 
In model (3) where we regress Brand Royalty on Holding_Pure, Holding_Operating, and 
their interaction terms with RPTs Monitoring, we find that the coefficient on Holding_Pure (0.200) 
is significantly positive at the one percent level and the coefficient on Holding_Pure × RPTs 
Monitoring (-0.106) remains significantly negative at the five percent level. However, the 
coefficients on Holding_Operating and Holding_Operating × RPTs Monitoring are statistically 
insignificant. The results of model (3) indicate that abuse in intragroup brand royalty flows is more 
likely to occur when chaebol holding companies do not have their own income-generating 
operating units, and such tunneling behavior can be moderated by monitoring RPTs.  
 
5.2. Internal versus External Monitoring on RPTs 
 In the preceding analysis in Tables 3 and 4, we have used a composite measure of RPTs 
                                           
9 Note that a majority of business groups classified as Holding_Pure in the paper are also playing a role of head offices 
in which, besides owning the shares of subsidiaries, strategic planning, coordination of group activities, operational 
and consulting services are also provided to group member firms. 
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monitoring. In this subsection, we separately examine the three components of RPTs Monitoring: 
the KFTC monitoring, an RPTs committee, and an audit committee on the board of directors.  
Table 5 presents the regression results when we examine the components of RPT 
monitoring separately. In model (1), the coefficient on KFTC Monitoring (-0.121) is significantly 
negative at the five percent level, in support of the second hypothesis (H2) that a chaebol member 
firm pays a smaller amount of brand royalty fees when it is on the KFTC’s watch list for abusive 
RPTs. We also find that the coefficients on RPTs Committee (-0.112) in model (2) and Audit 
Committee (-0.093) in model (3) are significantly negative at the one percent level, in support of 
the second hypothesis (H2). 
Next, in model (4) where we include KFTC Monitoring, RPTs Committee and Audit 
Committee all together, we find that the coefficient on KFTC Monitoring (-0.104) is significantly 
negative but only at the ten percent level, the coefficient on RPTs Committee (-0.089) is 
significantly negative at the one percent level, and, finally, the coefficient on Audit Committee is 
statistically insignificant.  
In models (5), (6) and (7), we find that the coefficient on Holding is significantly positive 
(0.107, 0.173, and 0.227) at the one percent level, supporting the first hypothesis (H1). For the 
standalone effect of each component of RPTs Monitoring (H2), we find that only the KFTC 
Monitoring (-0.139) in model (5) is significantly positive at the five percent level whereas the 
coefficients on RPTs Committee in model (6) and Audit Committee in model (7) are statistically 
insignificant.  
More importantly, for the moderating effect of RPT monitoring (H2a), we find that the 
coefficient on Holding × KFTC Monitoring in model (5) is statistically insignificant whereas the 
coefficients on Holding × RPTs Committee (-0.112) and Holding × Audit Committee (-0.158) 
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remain significantly negative, in support of the moderating effect hypothesis (H2a).  
In summary, the results in models (5), (6), and (7) suggest that while internal monitoring 
through an RPTs committee or an audit committee helps curb excessive brand royalty flows within 
the chaebol under the holding company governance structure, external monitoring by the 
government agencies such as the KFTC unilaterally discourages brand royalty fee payments by 
chaebol member firms regardless of the corporate governance structure of the associated business 
group. 
 
5.3. Brand Royalty Collection by Brand-name Holder 
So far, we have focused on the amount of brand royalty fees paid by chaebol member 
firms to the brand-name holder (either the holding company or the core firm of the business group). 
In this subsection, we examine intragroup brand royalties from the perspective of royalty recipient 
firms that hold the group brand-name. We measure Brand Royalty as the ratio of brand royalty 
receipts to total revenues. 
In the sample, there are a total of 51 brand-name holders collecting brand royalty fees 
from 396 member firms. In Table 6, we re-estimate Equation (1) using the 51 brand royalty 
recipient firms and find the following. First, in model (1), the coefficient on Holding (0.205) is 
significantly positive at the one percent level, indicating that a brand-name holder collects a greater 
amount of brand royalty fee when it is a holding company that governs the business group than 
when it is an ordinary company which happens to own the title of the brand name or logo. The 
result is in line with the first hypothesis (H1) that business groups tend to charge to their member 
firms a greater amount of brand royalties when they control their member firms with the holding 
company governance structure.  
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Next, in support of the second hypothesis (H2), the coefficient on RPTs Monitoring (-
0.119) in model (2) is negative, but marginally significant at the ten percent level. When we include 
both Holding and RPTs Monitoring in model (3), the coefficient on RPTs Monitoring is no longer 
significant while the coefficient on Holding (0.184) remains significantly positive at the one 
percent level.  
Further, in model (4) where we includes the interaction term between Holding and RPTs 
Monitoring, we find that only the coefficient on the standalone Holding is statistically significant 
(H1), whereas the coefficients on RPTs Monitoring (H2) and Holding × RPTs Monitoring (H2a) 
are statistically insignificant. It appears that the holding company governance structure increases 
royalty receipts of group brand-name holders, but the effect of RPT monitoring on brand royalty 
receipts is non-existent or weak if any.  
Finally, in model (5), we find that the coefficients on both Holding_Pure (0.200) and 
Holding_Operating (0.231) are significantly positive at the one percent level. While the coefficient 
on Holding_Pure is smaller than that on Holding_Operating, they are not significantly different. 
We also estimate the regression of Brand Royalty on Holding_Pure, Holding_Operating, and their 
interaction terms with RPTs Monitoring (the same as model 3 in Table 4), but we find that the 
coefficients on Holding_Pure × RPTs Monitoring and Holding_Operating × RPTs Monitoring are 
insignificant (untabulated). 
All in all, the results in Table 6 strongly support the first hypothesis, but not the second 
hypothesis (except in model 2) and the moderating effect hypothesis. It may be influenced in part 
by the different sample size between the brand royalty paying firm analysis (396 observations in 





In this study, we examine intragroup brand royalty fees paid by member firms of large 
business groups and collected by group brand-name holders. Regulatory bodies and stakeholders 
have questioned if the amount of brand royalty fees are equitably determined and charged to 
member firms of large business groups. However, there has been a paucity of hard evidence or 
supporting scholarly research on the allegation because the contracts for intragroup brand royalty 
fee flows in the business group have remained at the discretion between brand-name holders and 
beneficiary firms and have not been publicly disclosed. The KFTC, Korea’s corporate watchdog, 
has mandated large business groups to disclose brand royalty fee information starting in 2018. We 
utilize this first-ever publicly disclosed brand royalty information to examine how brand royalty 
fees are determined and charged to member firms of business groups. 
 We document that, consistent with the allegations of the business press and a growing 
concern of the general public, some business groups use brand royalty fees opportunistically for 
controlling shareholders’ unfair profit reaping from RPTs (i.e., tunnel group resources to the 
controlling shareholders). More importantly, we also show that such an opportunistic tunneling 
practice of large business groups via intragroup brand royalty flows can be moderated by an 
external or internal monitoring on RPTs. 
 As in all empirical investigations, ours is subject to some limitations. Our study focuses 
on a sample of large business group member firms that are required by a corporate watchdog to 
disclose their brand royalty fee information in 2018. As we examine a single year period when the 
brand royalty fee information is disclosed first ever, our analysis is limited to the cross-sectional 
variation in brand royalty fees and thus we are not able to examine changes over time. Also, among 
the 1,098 sample firms subject to mandatory disclosure of the brand royalty fee information, 645 
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firms disclosed the absence of signed contracts for intragroup brand royalties. The result may be 
attributable to the fact that we only examine the first year of such a mandatory disclosure code. 
Accordingly, future research may extend the sample period and examine the time series in the 
amount of brand royalty fees and also the likelihood of disclosing brand royalty information.  
Last, our empirical findings in Korea may not be generalizable in other countries where 
they have different business models and governance mechanisms. Thus, a cross-country analysis 
of brand royalty fees will come if and when the brand royalty information is widely publicized in 




Almeida, Heitor, Chang-Soo Kim, & Hwanki Brian Kim. (2015). Internal Capital Markets in 
Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance. 70 (6), 
2539-2586. 
Annuncio, Charubala. (1996). Tata’s Brand Royalties: Chairman Ratan Tata's controversial bid to 
consolidate his empire faces flak from shareholders. Outlook India.  
https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/tatas-brand-royalties/202412. Accessed 
February 14, 2019.   
Bae, Hyun-jung, (2017). FTC to control chaebol's brand commission fees. The Korea Herald. 
http://khnews.kheraldm.com/view.php?ud=20171020000693&md=20171023003043_BL 
Accessed March 14, 2019. 
Bae, K.-H., Kang, J.-K., & Kim, J.-M. (2002). Tunneling or value added? Evidence from 
mergers by Korean business groups. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2695–2740. 
Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., & Lee, I. (2006). Business groups and tunneling: Evidence from private 
securities offerings by Korean chaebols. Journal of Finance, 61(5), 2415–2449. 
Campbell, T. L., & Keys, P. Y. (2002). Corporate governance in South Korea: The Chaebol 
experience. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(4), 373–391 
Center for Audit Quality. (2010). The CAQ’s Fourth Annual Individual Investor Survey ‘‘The 
Main Street Investor Survey.’’ Available at: 
http://www.thecaq.org/docs/pdf/2010investorsurvey.pdf?sfvrsn=2  
CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity. (2009). Related-Party Transactions: 
Cautionary Tales for Investors in Asia. 
Chang, S. J., & Hong, J. (2000). Economic performance of group affiliated companies in Korea: 
Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. Academy of Management 
Journal, 43(3), 429–448. 
Chang, S. J., & Hong, J. (2002). How much does the business group matter in Korea? Strategic 
Management Journal, 23(3), 265–274. 
Cheung, Y. L., P. R. Rau, & A. Stouraitis. (2006). Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: 
Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial 
Economics 82 (2), 343–386. 
Cheung, Y. L., Y. Qi, T. Lu, P. R. Rau, & A. Stouraitis. (2009). Buy high, sell low: How listed 
firms price asset transfers in related-party transactions. Journal of Banking and Finance 
33 (3), 914–924. 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, & A. Shleifer. (2008). The law and economics of 
self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430–465. 
European Commission. (2008). NACE Rev. 2 – Statistical classification of economic activities in 
the European Community. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. 
European Commission. (2011a). Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework, 
33 
 
Brussels, COM (2011)164. 
European Commission. (2011b). Feed Back Statement: Summary of Responses to the 
Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1982. Related Party Disclosures, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 57 Available at: www.fasb.org/pdf/fas57.pdf 
Huyghebaert, N., & L. Wang. (2012). Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese listed firms: 
The role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 20 (3), 308–332. 
International Accounting Standards Board (2008). Amendments to IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosures.  
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). (2009). Related Parties. 
International Standard on Auditing 550. Available at: 
http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/downloads/a029-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-550.pdf 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (1997). Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets. 
Harvard Business Review, 75(4), 41–48. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis 
of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance, 55(2), 867–891. 
Khanna, Tarun & Jan W. Rivkin. (2001). Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups 
in Emerging Markets. Strategic Management Journals. 22 (1), 45-74. 
Kim, B., Pae, J., & Yoo, C. Y. (2019). Business groups and tunneling: Evidence from corporate 
charitable contributions by Korean companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 154(3), 643-
666. 
Kim, Jinbang. (2013). Modularization of Korea’s Development Experience: Chaebol policy for 
suppression of economic power concentration. Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
Republic of Korea 
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). (2018a). Large Business Group Must Disclose Brand 
Royalty Fees in May every year. March 29 (Press Release in Korean).  
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). (2018b). Analysis on Income Sources of Holding 
Companies and Ownership. July 3 (Press Release in Korean). 
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). (2018c). Analysis on Current Status of Corporate 
Governance Structure of Large Business Groups. December 7 (Press Release in Korean). 
Lee, Hyo-sik. (2008). Holding Firms Reap Royalties from Subsidiaries. The Korea Times. 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/12/693_25154.html. Accessed December 
12, 2018. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2009). Guide on Fighting 




Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2012). Related Party 
Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168008-en 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2015). G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). (2004). Standing Advisory Group 
Meeting on Related Party Transaction, September, 2004. Available at: 
https://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/09082004_SAGMeeting/Related_Party_Tra
nsactions.pdf 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). (2014). Related Parties. Auditing 









Dependent Variable:  
  Brand Royalty ln(brand royalty fee) divided by ln(Sales) 
Independent Variables:  
Holding An indicator variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a business 
group with the holding company governance structure 
Holding_Pure An indicator variable that equals one if the holding company of the 
associated business group does not have its own operating business 
units 
Holding_Operating An indicator variable that equals one if the holding company of the 
associated business group has its own operating business units 
RPTs Monitoring An indicator variable that equals one if KFTC Monitoring =1 or RPTs 
Committee =1 or Audit Committee =1 
KFTC Monitoring An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is on the KFTC’s close 
monitoring list for unfair intragroup trade practices 
RPTs Committee An indicator variable that equals one if the business group has the 
related party transaction committee 
Audit Committee An indicator variable that equals one if the business group has the audit 
committee 
Controls and Others:  
Advertising ln(advertising expense) divided by ln(Sales) 
Big4audit An indicator variable that equals one if the firm hires Big 4 auditors 
External Sales ln(1+the ratio of the firm’s intragroup sales to total sales) 
Firm Age ln(the number of years since incorporation) 
Firm Size ln(total assets) 
Giving ln(charitable contributions) divided by ln(Sales) 
Group ROA ROA of the associated business group measured by the weighted 
average of ROAs of all member firms of the business group (weighting 
by total assets) 
Group Size ln(sum of total assets of all member firms in the associated business 
group) 
Leverage The book value of short- and long-term debt divided by the book value 
of equity 
Number of Member Firms The number of all member firms of the associated business group 
Operating Cash Flow Cash flows from operations divided by total sales 
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Ownership Percentage of 
Controlling Shareholder 
The proportion of total shares owned by the controlling shareholder of 
the associated business group 





Examples of brand royalty fee formulas of selected large business groups 
 




Brand royalty (BR) 
paying firms 
BR fee formulas 
Range of BR 













Halla Mits Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.60% Sold 
0.50 in FY 2017 
0.20 in FY 2018 
Mando Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.40% 0.40% 
Mokpo Newport Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.20% 0.40% 
Halla OMS Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.20% 0.40% 
Halla Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.10% 0.20% 
Halla Encom Consolidated sales – Advertising expenditure 0.10% Sold 











in FY 2017 and 
FY 2018 
Pacific GLAS Sales 0.03% 
Pacific Package Sales 0.03% 
Osulloc Sales 0.015% 










out of 60 
largest 
group list. 
0.04 in FY 
2017, but 
no information 
in FY 2018 
KECC Consolidated sales 0.05% 
Daeryun E&S Consolidated sales 0.03% 
Daeryun Power Consolidated sales 0.03% 
Hanil Leisure Consolidated sales 0.03% 
Byeollae Energy Consolidated sales 0.03% 








0.00 in FY 2017 













The Related Party Transactions Committee was established in April 2004 to enhance 
corporate transparency and promote fair transactions. The Committee is responsible for 
reviewing related party transactions. 
 
Composition 
In accordance with relevant laws and regulations, the Related Party Transactions 
Committee shall consist of  three Independent Directors who are appointed by resolution 




Convention & resolution 
The Related Party Transactions Committee shall meet at least once every quarter. The Head 
of  the Committee shall call meetings and notify the members and other participants of  the 
meeting time and place at least 24 hours in advance. 
The presence of  a majority of  all Committee members shall constitute a quorum and 
resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of  the votes of  members attending the meeting; 
provided that the Committee meeting may take place via electronic means, such as by 
conference call, within the scope provided by relevant laws. 
 
Authority 
The Related Party Transactions Committee shall have the authority to: 
 receive reports on transactions between the Company and its affiliates 
 order an investigation on documents of  related party transactions 
 recommend the Board of  Directors take corrective measures for related party 
transactions that violate laws or Company regulations 
 
Source: https://www.samsung.com/global/ir/governance-csr/board-committee/related-party-transaction/ 






Table 1  
Sample selection, company distribution, and descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Sample selection 
     Sample size 
Initial sample of firms from the large business groups that are mandated to 
disclose brand royalty transactions (60 largest business groups in 2017) 
 1,098 
Less:      
 
Firms in the business groups that do not have formal BR fee 
contracts with member firms 
645  
 
Firms in financial business groups and financial and insurance 
firms in other groups 
44  
 Firms with missing financial data 13  
Final sample (39 business groups in 2017)   396 
 
This panel presents the sample selection procedures of the final sample of 396 observations in 39 business 
groups. 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution 







Number of BG 




of firms in 
the final 
sample 
SK, LG, GS, NongHyup, Hyundai Heavy Industries, 
Hanjin, CJ, Booyoung, LS, Korea Investment,  
KOLON, Harim, Hankook Tire, Celltrion, SeAH, 
Halla, Dongwon, Amore Pacific, Meritz, Hanjin 
Heavy Industries, HiteJinro, Hansol 
 
22  17  203 
BG without the holding company governance 
structure 
 
Samsung, Hyundai, LOTTE, POSCO, Hanwha, 
Shinsegae, KT, Doosan, Daerim, S-Oil, Mirae Asset, 
Hyundai Department Store, Young Poong, DSME, 
Kumho Asiana, Hyosung, OCI, KT&G, KCC, 
Kyobo, Daewoo E&C, JungHeung Construction, 
Taekwang, SM, Kakao, E-land, DB, Hoban, HDC, 
Taeyoung, Naver, Dongkuk Steel, Nexon, 
Samchully, GM Korea, Kumho Petrochemical, 
Netmarble, Eugene 
 
38  22  193 
  60  39  396 
 
Financial business groups (in strikethrough text): NongHyup, Korea Investment, Mirae Asset, Meritz 
Business groups without BR fee contracts with member firms (in strikethrough text): Hyundai Heavy 
Industries, Daerim, Hyosung, Celltrion, Hyundai Department Store, Young Poong, KT&G, KCC, Kyobo, 




Panel C. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std dev Q1 Median Q3 
Brand Royalty 0.547 0.240 0.547 0.638 0.689 
Holding 0.513 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Holding_Pure 0.462 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Holding_Operating 0.051 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RPTs Monitoring 0.717 0.451 0.000 1.000 1.000 
KFTC Monitoring 0.152 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RPTs Committee 0.540 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Audit Committee 0.679 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Advertising 0.507 0.307 0.343 0.626 0.727 
Big4Audit 0.859 0.349 1.000 1.000 1.000 
External Sales 0.484 0.245 0.333 0.596 0.678 
Firm Age 2.692 0.919 2.197 2.833 3.401 
Firm Size 19.579 1.877 18.230 19.325 20.838 
Giving 0.426 0.286 0.000 0.543 0.653 
Leverage 1.774 4.524 0.432 1.003 1.867 
Operating Cash Flow 0.043 0.579 0.011 0.053 0.141 
Ownership Percentage of  
Controlling Shareholder 
8.179 22.924 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 0.042 0.081 0.007 0.038 0.073 
Group ROA 0.038 0.081 0.001 0.009 0.041 
Group Size 23.647 1.623 22.402 23.858 25.249 
Number of Member Firms 22.247 17.131 10.000 16.500 23.000 
 
 
Panel D. Comparison of Firms under the Holding Company Governance Structure and others 
 
Variables 






 Mean Median Mean Median  t-test z-test 
Brand Royalty 0.608 0.667 0.482 0.599  <0.01 <0.01 
Holding 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000  <0.01 <0.01 
Holding_Pure 0.901 1.000 0.000 0.000  <0.01 <0.01 
Holding_Operating 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000  <0.01 <0.01 
RPTs Monitoring 0.635 1.000 0.803 1.000  <0.01 <0.01 
KFTC Monitoring 0.054 0.000 0.254 0.000  <0.01 <0.01 
RPTs Committee 0.399 0.000 0.689 1.000  <0.01 <0.01 
Audit Committee 0.616 1.000 0.746 1.000  <0.01 <0.01 
Advertising 0.489 0.605 0.526 0.658  0.23 0.22 
Big4Audit 0.921 1.000 0.793 1.000  <0.01 <0.01 
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External Sales 0.500 0.604 0.467 0.588  0.18 0.88 
Firm Age 2.672 2.833 2.712 2.833  0.67 0.64 
Firm Size 19.670 19.475 19.484 19.282  0.33 0.46 
Giving 0.421 0.535 0.432 0.544  0.71 0.73 
Leverage 1.698 1.036 1.855 0.915  0.73 0.50 
Operating Cash Flow 0.019 0.054 0.069 0.051  0.38 0.98 
Ownership Percentage of  
Controlling Shareholder 
1.972 0.000 14.708 0.000 
 
<0.01 <0.01 
ROA 0.039 0.039 0.044 0.035  0.49 0.93 
Group ROA 0.032 0.006 0.045 0.013  0.13 <0.01 
Group Size 23.982 23.736 23.295 23.858  <0.01 <0.01 
Number of Member Firms 25.778 14.000 18.534 20.000  <0.01 0.36 
 
 
Panel E. Comparison of Ownership Percentage of Controlling Shareholders  
 
Variables Sample 
BR paying firms 
(N=396) 









































governed by holding 
companies (N=203) 
Holding company 
brand holders (N=18) 
 p-value 
Mean Median Mean Median  t-test z-test 
1.972 0.000 25.740 23.295  <0.01 <0.01 
Chaebols without 
holding companies 
Member firms  
(N=193) 
Non-holding company 
brand holders (N=33) 
 p-value 
Mean Median Mean Median  t-test z-test 
14.708 0.000 10.254 1.230  0.26 0.04 
 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
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Table 2  
Pearson correlation matrix 
 
  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
Brand Royalty [1] 0.264*** 0.007 0.257*** 0.153*** 0.343*** 0.149*** 0.415*** 0.331*** 0.008 0.249*** -0.154*** 0.212*** 0.145*** 0.195*** 0.117** 
Holding [2]  -0.186*** -0.061 0.184*** 0.068 -0.022 0.050 -0.019 -0.017 -0.044 -0.278*** -0.035 -0.077 0.212*** 0.212*** 
RPTs Monitoring [3]    -0.019 0.131*** -0.175*** 0.080 0.163*** 0.120*** -0.034 0.042 0.206*** 0.040 0.018 0.639*** 0.464*** 
Advertising [4]      0.061 0.254*** 0.063 0.340*** 0.331*** -0.029 0.140*** -0.074 0.028 0.195*** 0.015 0.020 
Big4Audit [5]        0.019 0.096** 0.250*** 0.148*** 0.045 0.100*** -0.073 -0.101** -0.057 0.218*** 0.105** 
External Sales [6]          0.115** 0.215*** 0.167*** 0.019 0.176*** -0.116** -0.009 0.102** -0.131*** -0.103** 
Firm Age [7]            0.254*** 0.197*** -0.053 0.061 0.040 0.063 0.154*** 0.015 -0.081* 
Firm Size [8]              0.461*** -0.063 0.104** -0.083* 0.112** 0.503*** 0.244*** 0.083* 
Giving [9]                -0.087* 0.090* 0.003 0.127** 0.109** 0.105** 0.068 
Leverage [10]                  -0.047 -0.070 -0.173*** -0.018 0.013 0.029 
Operating Cash Flow [11]                    -0.017 0.235*** 0.051 -0.030 0.026 
Ownership Percentage of 
Controlling Shareholder 
[12]                      -0.072 0.028 -0.186*** -0.100** 
ROA [13]                        0.225** 0.040 0.059 
Group ROA [14]                          -0.018 -0.022 
Group Size [15]                            0.775*** 
Number of Member Firms [16]                              
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in our analysis. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3  
Determinants of brand royalty fees  
 
Dependent variable = Brand Royalty 



















































































































































      
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2  39.15% 36.85% 39.80% 40.54% 
N  396 396 396 396 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results of brand royalty fee payments by large business group member firms. 
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * denote statistical 




Table 4  
The effect of the holding company on brand royalty fees: pure vs. operating holding 
companies 
 
Dependent variable = Brand Royalty 






















Holding_Pure×RPTs Monitoring    
-0.106** 
(-2.01) 
Holding_Operating×RPTs Monitoring    
-0.133 
(-1.01) 
































































































     
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2  39.15% 40.29% 40.93% 
N  396 396 396 
 
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5  
The effect of related-party transaction monitoring on brand royalty payments by components of RPT monitoring 
 
Dependent variable = Brand Royalty 


























































Holding×Audit Committee        
-0.158*** 
(-3.01) 
         
Controls and Fixed Effects  Identical to Tables 3 and 4 
Adjusted 𝑅2  35.44% 36.60% 35.43% 37.30% 40.07% 39.50% 40.54% 
N  396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
 
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Refer to Appendix A for 
variable definitions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6  
Brand royalty fees received by group brand-name holders 
 
Dependent variable = Brand Royalties Received by Brand-name Holders 





















Holding_Pure      
0.200*** 
(2.59) 
Holding_Operating      
0.231*** 
(2.66) 




























































































































       
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 𝑅2  58.62% 52.28% 58.70% 57.47% 57.45% 
N  51 51 51 51 51 
 
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
 
 
